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TWO ARGUMENTS FOR AN EMPIRICAL
FOUNDATION OF NATURAL-LAW NORMS:
AN EXAMINATION OF JOHANNES MESSNER'S
AND VICTOR KRAFT'S APPROACHES*
Alfred Verdross**

I.

THE IS AND THE OUGHT

The main objection that has been raised against the possibility
of natural law is that human nature, as nature in general, is a fact
and thus an "Is" (ein Sein), from which no norms, that is, no
"Ought" (ein Sollen) can be derived. 1 The doctrine of the underivability of an "Ought" from an "Is," which was first expounded by
Hume, 2 was espoused by Kant, who rendered it radical by contraposing the Is of nature and the Ought of moral law. 3 Hans Kelsen,
invoking this radical doctrine, makes a distinction between the. explanatory sciences of causation and the normative sciences that
receive their content from norms which, indeed, can be linked with
each other and whose main groups depend on a basic norm but
never on an Is. Between the causal order of nature and the diverse
systems of norms there lies an "unbridgeable gap." 4
The first question that confronts the doctrine of natural law is:
how can social norms be ascertained from the Is of human nature?
This question raises the preliminary problem as to whether there is
a constant human nature at all, a secondary issue which has to be
decided before the answer to the main question can be sought.

II.

THE CONSTANT ENDS OF HUMAN NATURE

As against those modern writers of philosophical anthropology,
including Jean-Paul Sartre5 and Werner Maihofer, 6 who dispute
* Ilmar Tammelo, trans.
**Prof. Emeritus, Vienna; Dr. Jur., Vienna; Dr. Honoris Causa, University of Paris; Dr.
Honoris Causa, Salamanca University.
1. H. KELSEN, REINE RECHTSLEHRE 46, 359 (1960).
2. D. HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS (1751).
3. I. KANT, KRITIK DER PRAKTISCHEN VERNUFT (1788).
4. Kelsen had already reached this conclusion in his book Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre, published in 1911. However, in 1963, he adopted the view that a norm presupposes
an "imperator," i.e., a norm-positing will. Thus he returned to the nominalistic grounding of
law by William Ockham (1290-1349). See Kelsen, Zum Begriff der Norm, in 1 FESTSCHRIFT
fiiR H. C. HIPPERDEY 57 (1963); Kelsen, Norm und Logik, 12 FORUM [Vienna] 421 (1965).
5. J . SARTRE, L'ETRE ET LE NEANT (1943); J. SARTRE, L'Ex1sTENTIALISM EST UN HuMANISME
(1953).
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that there is a constant nature of man at all, Johannes Messner and
Victor Kraft agree that despite all human evolution there remains
a constant in human nature. Such a constant is for Messner the
steadfast striving for goods that are necessary for our preservation
and for our development~a striving implanted in our nature. 7
Even this starting point shows that Messner stands on classical
ground. For it was Aristotle who was the first to point out the tension between the nature present only seminally (dynamei on) and
the unfolded nature (energeia on, eidos physis) and who conceived
of the latter as the anticipated end toward which every living being
was striving, by its nature. 8 Since man can come to the full development of his being and thereby to "good life" (eu zen) only in a
community that comprises all aspects of life, Aristotle regards the
polis as the end (telos) for which men strive by their nature
(physei), 9 because in classical antiquity the only such community
was the polis. The Aristotelian doctrine of State is therefore primarily a doctrine of the ancient polis. 10
The order of polis was regarded to exist, above all, for the sake
of the welfare (eu zen) of free men, who alone were full citizens. The
polis was thus considered not to be an end itself but a means for the
achievement of the welfare of its full citizens. 11 Therefore Aristotle
could say that the statesman who had founded it (in fulfillment of
the ends sought by men out of their very nature) was "the originator
of the highest good." 12 However, the Aristotelian doctrine of the
State goes beyond the ancient polis, because Aristotle conceived of
man as a being who by his nature (physei) aims at an allcomprehensive community of life (in the fashion of a polis). In this
sense man is by nature a political animal (anthropos physei zoon
politicon). 13
6. W. MAIHOFER, NATURRECHT ALS EXISTENZRECHT (1963).
7. J. MESSNER, DAs NATURRECHT 225 (1950). This work has now appeared in five editions,
and has been translated into several languages. Quotations here are from the 1950 edition,
which was published shortly before the second edition of V. Kraft's Die Grundlagen einer
wissenschaftlichen Wertlehre (1951) which contained his Foundation of Individual Valuations
for the first time. This formed the basis for Kraft's writings in Rationale Moralbegrundung
(1963) and Die Grundlagen der Erkenntnis und der Moral (1968).
8. ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS, IV.2, 1005a; POLITICS, I.2, 1252b. See also A. VERDROSS,
ABENDLANDISCHE RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 40-41. (1963); Verdross, Die aristotelische Naturrectslehre 56 ARCHIV FOR RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 527 (1970).
9. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, l.2, 1252b.
10. See generally J. RITTER, NATURRECHT BEi ARISTOTELES (1961).
11. A. VERDROSS, 8TATISCHES UND DYNAMISCHES NATURRECHT 19 (1971).
12. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, l.2, 1253a.
13. Id.
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Those ends which are pursued naturally by man are called
"existential purposes" (existentielle Zwecke) by Messner. As mundane ends of this kind, he mentions: self-preservation, selfperfection in physical and mental respects, expansion of knowledge,
procreation, education of children, social association for preservation of peace and order and promotion of general welfare. 14 He
remarks that not only are ends found in human nature, with its
"drive-constitution," but as well an order of these ends. Thus, the
outer material things are not ends in themselves, but means for
other ends wherein man finds the fulfillment of his nature-ends
such as the keeping of a home and a family. Family and social life
are oriented to the preservation of human nature having the consummation of man in the "good life" (Aristotle) as their end. 15
By his nature, man is thus not only an individual being, but
just as much a social being. Both aspects of man are inseparably
associated with each other. "The individual nature of man cannot
unfold itself without a connection with society and man cannot fit
into society without being a person, that is, without being an individual being on the basis of his spiritual nature." 16 This trend of
man towards a "telos," toward an end, is constant; it is encountered
in every stage of civilization.
Victor Kraft likewise recognizes that there are human aspirations which are universal, because they appear in everybody by
virtue of his nature. This view is the more notable because it is
expressed by a scholar who belongs to an entirely different philosophical camp as Messner, namely to the neo-positivist "Vienna
Circle," 17 and who thus stands on strictly empirical grounds. In his
philosophy of values Kraft shows that from the "oganization of
man" certain basic valuations resulted which must obtain in every
civilization. They must be present even in the most primitive stages
of civilization at least in a rudimentary manner. These valuations
relate not only to what is required for the immediate preservation
of life, for example, the need for food, clothes, shelter and medicines, but also to anticipatory planning; making provision for the
14. Messner speaks also of supramundane purposes, viz., "the knowledge and reverence
of the Creator and the final fulfillment of human existence through merging with Him." He
adds: "There is no doubt that the above list meets with a general assent." J. MESSNER, supra
note 7, at 37.
15. Id. at 38.
16. Id. at 110.
17. See F. AusTEDA, MonERNE PHILOSOPHIE 113 (1972). See also V. KRAFT, THE VIENNA
CIRCLE, THE ORIGIN OF NEo-PosITIVISM (1953).
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future and involving knowledge requisite for the mastery of nature.
Moreover, man is organized in such a manner that he can achieve
the unfolding of his proper being not in isolation but only in a social
group. The recognition of a social group implies the recognition of
all values necessary for its preservation.1 8
Kraft rejects the conception of a realm of values of the nature
of the Platonic forms which hover above the domain of factuality.
All values rest, according to him, on appraisals of man in regard to
certain persons or objects. 19 Nevertheless, he recognizes values
which have a general and supra-individual validity because they
are anchored in the general, constant and "end-oriented" nature of
man. 20
In a recent work, Kraft further says that there are "primary
aspirational ends" (primiire Strebensziele) whose attainment is
"the condition for the satisfaction of all other desires of man."
Therefore they have precedence over all other ends. These primary
aspirational ends, set by nature, are divided by Kraft into the
following four main groups:
1. Self-preservation. The striving for self-preservation could
indeed become extinguished, as a result of unrelenting suffering,
and man can be driven to suicide, but it is nevertheless an originally
natural drive of man.
2. Avoidance of injury to oneself. Everyone wants by his nature to avoid all injuries to himself.
3. Freedom of action. Everyone wants not to be hindered in
the realization of his intentions and not to be forced to actions, even
though many want to be guided and directed.
4. Mutual assistance. Everyone desires as a matter of natural
necessity to be supported by others, because everyone is dependent
on the help of others. 21
Messner and Kraft, despite their different philosophical bases,
concur that human nature is not mere fact which can be explained
only by causal laws, but has also an "aspirational aspect" which is
oriented to the self-preservation, self-unfolding and self-perfection
of man. But whereas Kraft is content with grounding this view on
experience, Messner regards the above ends as implanted into
human nature by God. 22
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

V. KRAFT, DIE GRUNDLAGEN EINER WISSENSCHAFTLICHEN WERTLEHRE 249 (1951).
Id. at 250.
Id.
V. KRAFT, DIE GRUNDLAGEN DER ERKENNTNIS UND DER MORAL 115-17 (1968).
J. MESSNER, supra note 7, at 154.
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THE GROUNDING OF PRIMARY SOCIAL NORMS IN
CONSTANT ENDS IMMANENT IN HUMAN NATURE

Johannes Messner considers the primary social norms as
founded on the "existential purposes" present in nature. Since man
can achieve his preservation and unfolding only by the aid of society, the purpose of society consists of making it possible for individual man to fulfill the tasks of his life through the cooperation of
the members of society. For this purpose, society must create, above
all, an external order, which provides protection to its members
against encroachments. Further, it must help them to achieve their
economic and cultural welfare. 23 These ends can be attained by
society only through the creation of a positive legal order which
serves them. Hence the formation of positive law must be guided by
ends founded on nature.
Accordingly, Messner defines natural law as "the order of social
relations that accords with the existential purposes of man." 24 From
this definition it follows that primary natural law contains only
general principles. It represents by no means a legal system that
would hold good for all times. Nevertheless, these basic principles
are "sufficiently definite in their meaning to guide the social authority in the establishment of a social order." 25 Thus they enable said
authority to create, in every historical situation, a positive law that
corresponds to the requirements of natural law. Messner remarks
quite rightly that "a considerable pragmatic element" is unavoidable in the creation of this law. 26
A similar course is followed by Victor Kraft, who teaches that
the natural aspirations mentioned in the previous section can be
actualized only when the basic requirement is recognized according
to which "everyone ought to desist from a desire whose satisfaction
hinders the attainment of a primary end" of another person. 27 The
four primary nature-given ends impose therefore the demand for the
establishment of the following four main principles of social morality (with certain limitations to be mentioned below):
1. Everyone ought to refrain from any action that endangers
the life of others.
23. Id. at 116-30.
24. Id. at 161.
25. Id. at 193.
26. Id. at 194. Messner later grounded natural law "existentially" also in family experiences. See generally J. MESSNER, DAS GEMEINWOHL (1962); J. MESSNER, MoDERNE SozIOLOGIE
UND SCHOLASTISCHES NATURRECHT (1961).
27. V. KRAIT, supra note 21, at 117.
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2. Everyone ought to abstain from all injuries to his fellow
human beings.
3. No one ought to impair the freedom of action of others
either by coercion or by threats.
4. Everyone ought to help others as far as possible. 28
The observance of these principles is a precondition for securing
"the achievement of the natural aims for all. " 29 Their validity rests
on the general volition of the primary ends; thus the general approval of these ends operates as the justification basis of the corresponding generally valid norms. 30 It is a matter of course that the
same claim of all men to the attainment of the primary ends is
presupposed here. This does not exclude, however, an objective differentiation of other claims.
The principles of social morality stated above are "not arbitrary
stipulations but are objectively determined as means for the attainment of natural ends." 31 The "Ought" is grounded in the general
volition of primary ends, because everyone who affirms an end ought
to do everything that is necessary for its attainment. The striving
for an end thus constitutes for Kraft the sole exception of the principle established since Hume that no norms can be derived from mere
statements of fact. 32 Thus a generally willed end provides us with a
norm.
The four principles of social morality cannot, however, have
absolute validity. Their validity must be suspended in relation to
those persons who violate them, for otherwise the primary ends
cannot be attained. Their non-observance must be prevented for the
sake of their actualization. Therefore "resistance could be offered to
an actual violation of a norm . . . . The warding off of its violation
is morally admissible. " 33
Since, however, the merely individual prevention of normviolations is not sufficient for achieving the observance of social
morality, law must "enter into the service of morality and help to
fufill its task." This is also necessary in view of the fact that "moral
norms contain quite general requirements which law must
concretize, apply to prevailing circumstances, and enforce against
28. Id.
29. V. KRAIT ,
30. Id. at 58.
31. Id. at 57.

RATIONALE MORALBEGR0NDUNG

59 (1963).

32. V. KRAIT, supra note 21, at 105-06.
33. Id. at 128.
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any resistance. " 34
These ends can be actualised, of course, only by the positive law
of a given community. However, if positive law stands in the service
of social morality, it seems to me that certain principles must be
asserted as a precondition of a detailed concretization of this morality. These principles call upon a social authority, not yet instituted
by inter-individual morality, to take legislative, administrative and
judicial measures for the protection of the members of the community, as well as for the protection of their existential purposes.
They also authorize it to resort to coercive measures not only for
warding off delictual acts but also to enforce rights and to perform
other tasks of the community. The role of natural law lies precisely
in these principles. Hence natural law is to be regarded as an intermediate instance between social morality and positive law35-if the
trend of thought of Kraft is brought to its conclusion-for he himself
does not provide a bridge between inter-individual social morality
and positive law.
The grounding of natural law by Messner and of social morality
by Kraft cannot be refuted by an objection which Kelsen has raised
(apart from the objection stated in the beginning of this essay)
against the possibility of the derivation of social norms from the
nature of man. Kelsen also thinks that such a derivation is excluded
because human nature exhibits social as well as asocial traits.
Therefore, only mutually inconsistent norms could be ascertained
from it, but never a natural law that would be free from internal
contradictions. 36 This objection proves to be untenable if it is recognized, with Messner and Kraft, that man can mature into a full
human being only in a community, and thus his asocial drives must
be combatted by the order of community. Hence these drives can
form only a basis for the ascertainment of requisite norms of prohibition.37
Neither of these two Austrian scholars-whose attempts to provide an empirical foundation to the norms of natural law or social
morality I have discussed in this essay-is a lawyer. So far their
arguments have scarcely been considered by lawyers. 38 Therefore, it
34. Id. at 133.
35. A. VERDROSS, supra note 11, at 100.
36. H . KELSEN , supra note 1, at 403, 411.
37. A. VERDROSS, supra note 11, at 62.
38. See, e.g., G. WINKLER, WERTBETRACHTUNG IM RECHT UND IHRE GRENZEN (1969); K.
WENGLER, DIE OFFENTLICHE UNTERNEHMUNG (1969) . These works concern themselves with
Kraft's theory of values, but do not enter into the natural law problematics of that theory.
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seemed to me appropriate to call attention to these arguments,
which are so important in laying the foundation to legal philosophy.
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